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Abstract: This paper is concerned with non-zero sum differential games of mean-field stochastic differential equations with partial
information and convex control domain. First, applying the classical convex variations, we obtain stochastic maximum principle
for Nash equilibrium points. Subsequently, under additional assumptions, verification theorem for Nash equilibrium points is also
derived. Finally, as an application, a linear quadratic example is discussed. The unique Nash equilibrium point is represented in a
feedback form of not only the optimal filtering but also expected value of the system state, throughout the solutions of the Riccati
equations.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study partial information stochastic differ-
ential game problems in which system states are governed by
stochastic differential equations (SDEs) of mean-field type, in
the sense that the coefficients of the SDEs depend not only on
the system states, but also on their expected values. Also, the
SDEs of mean-field type are often used to describe the aggre-
gate behavior of lots of mutually interacting particles at meso-
scopic level and play an important role in physics, finance, eco-
nomics, etc. For more information, we refer the reader, for in-
stance, to [6, 12] as well as the references therein. Recently, a
new kind of backward SDEs (BSDEs) of mean-field type has
been studied by Buckdahn et al. [3, 4] which is called mean-
field BSDEs. For classical control problems of SDEs without
mean field, we refer the readers to [13, 16], etc.
Mean-field games and mean-field control problems have re-
ceived considerable attention in the probability and optimal
control literature in recent years. Li [11] studied the stochas-
tic maximum principle for mean-field SDEs with convex con-
trol domain and also got the verification theorem under ad-
ditional conditions. Buckdahn, Djehiche and Li [2] used the
classical spike perturbation and derived a Peng-type general
stochastic maximum principle. Yong [15] investigated linear-
quadratic (LQ) optimal control problems for mean-field SDEs
and a feedback representation was obtained for the optimal
control. Lasry and Lions [10] presented three examples of
mean-field approach to modelling in Economics and Finance,
derived nonlinear mean-field SDEs and established their links
with various fields of Analysis. More recent developments
and their applications of mean-fiels games of SDEs can be
found in Bensoussan, Sung and Yam [1], Carmona, Delarue
and Lachapelle [5], Guant [8], etc., and the references therein.
Different from the above works, we consider two players non-
zero sum differential games of mean-field SDEs with partial
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information and convex control domain. The distinguishing
feature is the information available to the two players is the
sub-filtration of full information. The problem we study may
cover many control and game problems of mean-field SDEs
with complete information as special cases. The present work
will also enrich the relevant theory of stochastic filtering.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we specify the problem considered. Section 3 is devoted
to deriving the stochastic maximum principle and verification
theorem for Nash equilibrium points. Finally, in Section 4,
we solve an LQ example to explain our application. By in-
troducing the systems of some Riccati equations and forward-
backward stochastic filtering equations of mean-filed type, we
give the feedback representation for the unique Nash equilib-
rium point.
2 Formulation of Problem
Let |x| denote the Euclidian norm of x ∈ Rn and 〈x, y〉 be
the inner product of x, y ∈ Rn. The transpose and Euclidian
norm of a matrix M = (mij) 1≤i≤n
1≤j≤d
= (m1, · · · ,md) ∈ Rn×d
are expressed as M∗ and |M | =
√
trace(MM∗), respec-
tively. Similarly, 〈M1,M2〉 = trace (M1M∗2 ) with M1,M2 ∈
R
n×d
. Let T > 0 be a fixed constant and C be a posi-
tive constant which can be different from line to line. Let
(Ω,F , (Ft)0≤t≤T ,P) be a complete filtered probability space
on which Ft denotes a natural filtration generated by a stan-
dard Brownian motion (w1, w2) with values in Rd1+d2 .
We only consider the case of two players and define the ad-
missible control set Ui for Player i (i = 1, 2) by
Ui =
{
vi(·) | vi(·) : [0, T ]× Ω −→ Ui, is a G it -adapted
process satisfying E
∫ T
0
vi(t)
2dt <∞
}
, (1)
where Ui is a nonempty convex subset of Rri , and G it ⊆ Ft
denotes the information available to Player i. Every element
of Ui is called an open-loop admissible control for Player i on
[0, T] (i = 1, 2). And U1 × U2 is called the set of open-loop
admissible controls for the players. Unless otherwise stated,
Player 1 controls v1 and Player 2 controls v2.
In the following, we consider the controlled state equation
of mean-field type

dxv1,v2(t) = f (t, xv1,v2(t),Exv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t)) dt
+ σ1 (t, x
v1,v2(t),Exv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t)) dw1(t)
+ σ2 (t, x
v1,v2(t),Exv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t)) dw2(t),
xv1,v2(0) = x0, t ≥ 0,
(2)
and the cost functional
Ji(v1(·), v2(·))
= E
[∫ T
0
li (t, x
v1,v2(t),Exv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t)) dt
+ϕi(x
v1,v2(T ),Exv1,v2(T ))
]
, (3)
where the mappings
f(t, x, x˜, v1, v2) : Ω× [0, T ]× R
n+n × U1 × U2 → R
n,
σ1(t, x, x˜, v1, v2) : Ω× [0, T ]× R
n+n × U1 × U2 → R
n×d1 ,
σ2(t, x, x˜, v1, v2) : Ω× [0, T ]× R
n+n × U1 × U2 → R
n×d2 ,
li(t, x, x˜, v1, v2) : Ω× [0, T ]× R
n+n × U1 × U2 → R,
ϕi(x, x˜) : Ω× R
n+n → R,
satisfy the following assumptions:
(A1) the coefficients f, σ1 and σ2 are Ft-adapted and bounded
by C(1 + |x|+ |x˜|+ |v1|+ |v2|). They are also continu-
ously differentiable with respect to (x, x˜, v1, v2) and their
partial derivatives are Lipschitz continuous and uniformly
bounded.
(A2) l1 and l2 are Ft-adapted and continuously differen-
tiable with respect to (x, x˜, v1, v2). ϕ1 and ϕ2 are FT -
measurable and continuously differentiable with respect
to (x, x˜). Moreover, their partial derivatives are Lipschitz
continuous and bounded by C(1+ |x|+ |x˜|+ |v1|+ |v2|).
Our aim is to find (u1, u2) ∈ U1 ×U2 such that{
J1(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ J1(v1(·), u2(·)),
J2(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ J2(u1(·), v2(·)),
(4)
for all (v1, v2) ∈ U1 × U2. We call (u1, u2) an open-loop
Nash equilibrium point of the game problem (if it exists).
Since G 1t and G 2t are the sub-information of Ft, it implies
this is the partial information game problem. On the contrary,
when G 1t = G 2t = Ft, t ∈ [0, T ], it reduces to be a com-
plete information case. So the problem (1)-(4) denotes the par-
tial information nonzero-sum differential game problem of the
mean-field-type SDEs. For simplicity, we denoted it by Prob-
lem (MF).
3 Nash Equilibrium Point
3.1 Necessary Conditions
In this subsection, we establish a necessary conditions for
Nash equilibrium points of Problem (MF). Let us suppose now
that
(
u1(·), u2(·)
)
is an equilibrium point with the correspond-
ing optimal state x(·). Then we define the perturbed control as
follows:
uεi(t) = ui(t) + εi(vi(t)− ui(t)), (5)
where εi > 0 is sufficiently small and vi(t) is an arbi-
trary admissible control of Player i (i = 1, 2). Notice
that Ui is convex, then for 0 ≤ εi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , it
yields uεi(t) ∈ Ui. We denote by xε1 (·)
(
resp. xε2(·)
)
the
state xuε1 ,u2
(
resp. xu1,uε2
)
associated with
(
uε1(·), u2(·)
)(
resp. (u1(·), uε2(·))
)
. For simplicity, we set g(t) =
g (t, x(t),Ex(t), u1(t), u2(t)) , g = f, σ1, σ2, l1, l2.
We introduce the following variational equations:


dxi(t) =
[
fx(t)x
i(t) + fx˜(t)Ex
i(t)
+ fvi(t)(vi(t)− ui(t))
]
dt
+
[
σ1x(t)x
i(t) + σ1x˜(t)Ex
i(t)
+ σ1vi(t)(vi(t)− ui(t))
]
dw1(t)
+
[
σ2x(t)x
i(t) + σ2x˜(t)Ex
i(t)
+ σ2vi(t)(vi(t)− ui(t))
]
dw2(t),
xi(0) = 0, i = 1, 2.
(6)
For i = 1, 2, we set
x¯εi(t) = ε
−1
i
(
xεi(t)− x(t)
)
− xi(t),
ψε1(t) =
(
xε1 (t),Exε1 (t), uε1(t), u2(t)
)
,
ψλε1(t) =
(
x(t) + λε1
(
x1(t) + x¯ε1(t)
)
,Ex(t)
+ λε1E
(
x1(t) + x¯ε1(t)
))
,
φλε1 (t) =
(
x(t) + λε1
(
x1(t) + x¯ε1(t)
)
,Ex(t)
+ λε1E
(
x1(t) + x¯ε1(t)
)
, u1(t)
+ λε1
(
v1(t)− u1(t)
)
, u2(t)
)
.
Then by a similar method as shown in Li [11] and Hui and Xiao
[9] with a minor modification, we have the following conver-
gence result.
Lemma 3.1. Under Assumption (A1), we have
lim
ε1→0
E sup
0≤t≤T
|xε1 (t)− x(t)|
2 = 0,
lim
ε2→0
E sup
0≤t≤T
|xε2 (t)− x(t)|
2 = 0.
(7)
Proof. By Assumption (A1) and the Burkholder-Davis-
Gundy inequality, we derive
E sup
0≤t≤T
|xε1 (t)− x(t)|
2
≤ 3TE
∫ T
0
|f
(
t, ψε1(t)
)
− f(t)|2dt
+ 12E
∫ T
0
|σ1
(
t, ψε1(t)
)
− σ1(t)|
2dt
+ 12E
∫ T
0
|σ2
(
t, ψε1(t)
)
− σ2(t)|
2dt
≤ CTE
∫ T
0
|xε1(t)− x(t)|
2dt
+ ε21CTE
∫ T
0
|v1(t)− u1(t)|
2dt,
where CT > 0 is a constant only depending on T > 0 and
the Lipschitz coefficients of f , σ1 and σ2. From Gronwall’s
inequality we get the desired result. 
Lemma 3.2. Under Assumption (A1), it yields
lim
ε1→0
E sup
0≤t≤T
|x¯ε1 (t)|
2 = 0,
lim
ε2→0
E sup
0≤t≤T
|x¯ε2 (t)|
2 = 0.
(8)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we prove the first result
of (8) and the latter one can be similarly derived. For g =
f, σ1, σ2, we set
a1g(t) =
∫ 1
0
gx(t, φ
λ
ε1
(t))dλ,
a2g(t) =
∫ 1
0
gx˜(t, φ
λ
ε1
(t))dλ,
a3g(t) =
∫ 1
0
(
gx(t, φ
λ
ε1
(t))− gx(t)
)
dλ · x1(t)
+
∫ 1
0
(
gx˜(t, φ
λ
ε1
(t)) − gx˜(t)
)
dλ · Ex1(t)
+
∫ 1
0
(
gv1(t, φ
λ
ε1
(t)) − gv1(t)
)
dλ ·
(
v1(t)− u1(t)
)
.
Due to Assumption (A1), a1g and a2g are both uniformly
bounded and lim
ε1→0
E
(
sup
0≤t≤T
|a3g(t)|
2
)
= 0. Then we have


dx¯ε1 (t) = [a
1
f (t)x¯ε1 (t) + a
2
f (t)Ex¯ε1 (t) + a
3
f (t)]dt
+ [a1σ1(t)x¯ε1 (t) + a
2
σ1
(t)Ex¯ε1 (t) + a
3
σ1
(t)]dw1(t)
+ [a1σ2(t)x¯ε1 (t) + a
2
σ2
(t)Ex¯ε1 (t) + a
3
σ2
(t)]dw2(t),
x¯ε1 (0) = 0.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to |x¯ε1(t)|2 and Assumption (A1),
we have
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|x¯ε1(t)|
2
]
≤ CE
∫ T
0
|x¯ε1 (t)|
2dt
+ CE
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(
|a3f (t)|
2 + |a3σ(t)|
2 + |a3σ2(t)|
2
)]
.
Then we can get the first convergence result of (8) from Gron-
wall’s inequality. 
Since (u1(·), u2(·)) is the Nash equilibrium point, then it
follows that
ε−11 [J1(uε1(·), u2(·))− J1(u1(·), u2(·))] ≥ 0 (9)
and
ε−12 [J2(u1(·), uε2(·)) − J2(u1(·), u2(·))] ≥ 0. (10)
Lemma 3.3. Let Assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold. Then the
following variational inequality holds for i=1, 2:
E
∫ T
0
[
lix(t)x
i(t)+ lix˜(t)Ex
i(t)+ livi(t)(vi(t)−ui(t))
]
dt
+ E[ϕix(x(T ),Ex(T ))x
i(T ) + ϕix˜(x(T ),Ex(T ))Ex
i(T )]
≥ 0. (11)
Proof. We firstly prove (11) holds for i = 1 and the another
case can be similarly derived. From (9), it yields
0 ≤ε−11 [J1(uε1(·), u2(·)) − J1(u1(·), u2(·))]
=ε−11 E
∫ T
0
[
l1(t, ψε1(t))− l1(t)
]
dt
+ ε−11 E
[
ϕ1(xε1 (T ),Exε1(T ))− ϕ1(x(T ),Ex(T ))
]
=I1 + I2.
From Assumptions (A1), (A2) and Lemma 3.2, we derive
I1 = E
∫ T
0
[∫ 1
0
l1x(t, φ
λ
ε1
(t))dλ ·
(
x1(t) + x¯ε1(t)
)
+
∫ 1
0
l1x˜(t, φ
λ
ε1
(t))dλ · E
(
x1(t) + x¯ε1(t)
)
+
∫ 1
0
l1v1(t, φ
λ
ε1
(t))dλ ·
(
v1(t)− u1(t)
)]
dt
−→ E
∫ T
0
[
l1x(t)x
1(t) + l1x˜(t)Ex
1(t)
+ l1v1(t)
(
v1(t)− u1(t)
)]
dt, (12)
I2 = E
[∫ 1
0
ϕ1x
(
ψλε1(T )
)
dλ ·
(
x¯ε1 (T ) + x
1(T )
)
+
∫ 1
0
ϕ1x˜
(
ψλε1(T )
)
dλ · E
(
x¯ε1 (T ) + x
1(T )
)]
−→ E
[
ϕ1x(x(T ),Ex(T ))x
1(T )
+ ϕ1x˜(x(T ),Ex(T ))Ex
1(T )
]
. (13)
Combining (12) with (13), the inequality (11) follows for i =
1. 
Next, we define the Hamiltonian functionHi : [0, T ]×Rn×
R
n × U1 × U2 × R
n × Rn×d1 × Rn×d2 → R as follows:
Hi(t, a, a˜, v1, v2, qi, ki1, ki2)
, 〈qi, f(a, a˜, v1, v2)〉+ 〈ki1, σ1(a, a˜, v1, v2)〉
+ 〈ki2, σ2(a, a˜, v1, v2)〉+ li(a, a˜, v1, v2),
and denote Hi(t) = Hi
(
t, x(t),Ex(t), u1(t), u2(t), qi(t),
ki1(t), ki2(t)
)
, i = 1, 2. Let us consider the following adjoint
BSDE of mean-field type


−dqi(t) =
[
f∗x(t)qi(t) + E
(
f∗x˜(t)qi(t)
)
+ σ∗1x(t)ki1(t)
+ E
(
σ∗1x˜(t)ki1(t)
)
+ σ∗2x(t)ki2(t)
+ E
(
σ∗2x˜(t)ki2(t)
)
+ l∗ix(t) + El
∗
ix˜(t)
]
dt
− ki1(t)dw1(t)− ki2(t)dw2(t),
qi(T ) =ϕ
∗
ix
(
x(T ),Ex(T )
)
+ Eϕ∗ix˜
(
x(T ),Ex(T )
)
,
(14)
which coupled with (2) constitutes a forward-backward SDE
(FBSDE) of mean-field type.
In the sequel, we state necessary conditions of Nash equilib-
rium points, i.e. stochastic maximum principle as follows:
Theorem 3.1 (Maximum Principle). Suppose (A1) and (A2)
hold. Let (u1(·), u2(·)) be a Nash equilibrium point of
Problem (MF) with the corresponding solutions x(·) and(
qi(·), ki1(·), ki2(·)
)
of (2) and (14). Then it follows that
E[H1v1 (t)|G
1
t ](v1 − u1(t)) ≥ 0 (15)
and
E[H2v2(t)|G
2
t ](v2 − u2(t)) ≥ 0, (16)
dtdP− a.e., for any v1 ∈ U1 and v2 ∈ U2.
Proof. We firstly prove (15). Applying Itoˆ’s formula to
〈x1(t), q1(t)〉, for any v1(·) ∈ U1 we obtain
E
[
ϕ1x
(
x(T ),Ex(T )
)
x1(T ) + ϕ1x˜
(
x(T ),Ex(T )
)
Ex1(T )
]
= E
∫ T
0
[
− l1x(t)x
1(t)− l1x˜(t)Ex
1(t)
− l1v1(t)
(
v1(t)− u1(t)
)]
dt
+ E
∫ T
0
H1v1(t)
(
v1(t)− u1(t)
)
dt. (17)
This together with the variational inequality (11) derives
E
∫ T
0
E
[
H1v1(t)
∣∣G 1t ] (v1(t)− u1(t))dt
= E
∫ T
0
H1v1(t)
(
v1(t)− u1(t)
)
dt ≥ 0, (18)
for all v1(·) ∈ U1, which implies (15) holds. By the similar
method above, (16) is also true. 
3.2 Sufficient Conditions
In what follows, we proceed to establish the sufficient con-
ditions of Nash equilibrium points (also called verification the-
orem).
Theorem 3.2 (Verification Theorem). Let (A1) and (A2) hold.
Let (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 with the corresponding solu-
tions x and (qi, ki1, ki2) to the equations (2) and (14). Sup-
pose Hi
(
t, a, a˜, v1, v2, qi(t), ki1(t), ki2(t)
)
and ϕi are convex
with respect to (a, a˜, vi). Moreover,
E
[
H1
(
t, x(t),Ex(t), u1(t), u2(t), q1(t), k11(t),
k12(t)
)∣∣G 1t ] = inf
v1∈ U1
E
[
H1
(
t, x(t),Ex(t), v1 , u2(t),
q1(t), k11(t), k12(t)
∣∣G 1t ] , (19)
E
[
H2
(
t, x(t),Ex(t), u1(t), u2(t), q2(t), k21(t),
k22(t)
)∣∣G 2t ] = inf
v2∈ U2
E
[
H2
(
t, x(t),Ex(t), u1(t), v2,
q2(t), k21(t), k22(t)
∣∣G 2t ]. (20)
Then (u1(·), u2(·)) is a Nash equilibrium point of Problem
(MF).
Proof. Let vi(·) ∈ Ui, i = 1, 2. We denote by xv1 and x the
solutions to (2) associated with the admissible controls (v1, u2)
and (u1, u2), respectively. We set
H1(t) = H1
(
t, x(t),Ex(t), u1(t), u2(t), q1(t), k11(t),
k12(t)
)
, Hv11 (t) = H1
(
t, xv1(t),Exv1 (t), v1(t), u2(t),
q1(t), k11(t), k12(t)
)
, g(t) = g
(
t, x(t),Ex(t), u1(t), u2(t)
)
,
gv1(t) = g
(
t, xv1 ,Exv1(t), v1(t), u2(t)
)
, g = f, σ1, σ2, l1.
By virtue of the convexity of ϕ1, we have for any v1(·) ∈ U1
J1(v1(·), u2(·)) − J1(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥ I1 + I2 (21)
with
I1 = E
[
ϕ1x(x(T ),Ex(T ))(x
v1 (T )− x(T ))
+ ϕ1x˜(x(T ),Ex(T ))E(x
v1 (T )− x(T ))
]
,
I2 = E
∫ T
0
(
lv11 (t)− l1(t)
)
dt
= E
∫ T
0
[
Hv11 (t)−H1(t)− 〈q1(t), f
v1(t)− f(t)〉
− 〈k11(t), σ
v1
1 (t)− σ1(t)〉
− 〈k12(t), σ
v1
2 (t)− σ2(t)〉
]
dt. (22)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈q1(t), xv1 (t)− x(t)〉, we have
I1 = E
∫ T
0
[
〈q1(t), f
v1(t)− f(t)〉
+ 〈k11(t), σ
v1
1 (t)− σ1(t)〉+ 〈k12(t), σ
v1
2 (t)− σ2(t)〉
− 〈H∗1x(t), x
v1(t)− x(t)〉
− 〈EH∗1x˜(t), x
v1 (t)− x(t)〉
]
dt. (23)
Substituting (22) and (23) into (21) and applying the convexity
of H1, we get
J1(v1(·), u2(·)) − J1(u1(·), u2(·))
≥ E
∫ T
0
(
Hv11 (t)−H1(t)− 〈H
∗
1x(t), x
v1(t)− x(t)〉
− 〈EH∗1x˜(t), x
v1 (t)− x(t)〉
)
dt
≥ E
∫ T
0
H1v1(t)
(
v1(t)− u1(t)
)
dt
= E
∫ T
0
E
[
H1v1(t)
∣∣G 1t ] (v1(t)− u1(t))dt. (24)
Condition (19) implies E [H1v1(t)∣∣G 1t ] (v1(t) − u1(t)) ≥ 0,
dtdP− a.e. on [0, T ], which derives
J1(v1(·), u2(·))− J1(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥ 0.
Similarly, we can also derive J2(u1(·), v2(·)) −
J2(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥ 0. The proof is completed. 
4 LQ Example
In this section, we work out an LQ example to illustrate the
theoretical result. Without loss of generality, we only consider
the following case: n = d1 = d2 = 1, b1(t)b2(t) 6= 0, t ∈
[0, T ]. Throughout this section, we assume additional condi-
tion.
(A3) m−11 (t)b21(t) = m−12 (t)b22(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
Example 4.1. Consider the system of linear mean-field SDE

dxv1,v2(t) =
[
a(t)xv1,v2(t) + a¯(t)Exv1,v2(t)
+ b1(t)v1(t) + b2(t)v2(t)
]
dt
+ c1(t)dw1(t) + c2(t)dw2(t),
xv1,v2(0) = x0,
(25)
with the quadratic cost functional
Ji
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)
=
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
(
gi(t)
(
xv1,v2(t)
)2
+ g¯i(t)
(
Exv1,v2(t)
)2
+mi(t)
(
vi(t)
)2)
dt
+hi
(
xv1,v2(T )
)2
+ h¯i
(
Exv1,v2(T )
)2] (26)
and the information available to two players G 1t = G 1t =
F
w1
t = σ{w1(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}.
Here, all coefficients with respect to t in (25) and (26) are
deterministic and uniformly bounded. In addition, gi and g¯i
are non-negative, hi and h¯i are non-negative constants, and
mi is positive. The set of admissible controls for Player i is
defined by
Ui = {vi(·) | vi(·) is an R-valued Fw1t -adapted process
satisfying E
∫ T
0
v2i (t)dt <∞}, i = 1, 2. (27)
Then the unique Nash equilibrium point is denoted by{
u1(t) = −m
−1
1 (t)b1(t)
(
τ1(t)xˆ(t) + δ1(t)Ex(t)
)
,
u2(t) = −m
−1
2 (t)b2(t)
(
τ2(t)xˆ(t) + δ2(t)Ex(t)
)
,
(28)
where Ex, (τ1, τ2), (δ1, δ2) and xˆ are determined by (38), (45),
(46) and (47), respectively.
Proof. We shall complete the proof by two parts.
Part 1. We first need to prove the unique Nash equilibrium
point can be represented by{
u1(t) = −m
−1
1 (t)b1(t)qˆ1(t),
u2(t) = −m
−1
2 (t)b2(t)qˆ2(t),
(29)
where x,
(
q1, k11, k12
)
and
(
q2, k21, k22
)
are the unique solu-
tion of the following coupled FBSDE of mean-field type

dx(t) =
[
a(t)x(t) + a¯(t)Ex(t) −m−11 (t)b
2
1(t)qˆ1(t)
−m−12 (t)b
2
2(t)qˆ2(t)
]
dt+ c1(t)dw1(t) + c2(t)dw2(t),
x(0) = x0,
(30)

−dq1(t) =
[
a(t)q1(t) + a¯(t)Eq1(t) + g1(t)x(t)
+ g¯1(t)Ex(t)
]
dt− k11(t)dw1(t)− k12(t)dw2(t),
q1(T ) = h1x(T ) + h¯1Ex(T ),
(31)
and

−dq2(t) =
[
a(t)q2(t) + a¯(t)Eq2(t) + g2(t)x(t)
+ g¯2(t)Ex(t)
]
dt− k21(t)dw1(t)− k22(t)dw2(t),
q2(T ) = h2x(T ) + h¯2Ex(T ).
(32)
Here we denote by pˆ(t) the mathematical expectation of
p(t) with respect to Fw1t , i.e., pˆ(t) , E
[
p(t)
∣∣Fw1t ] , p =
q1, q2, k11, k21, x. The rest of Part 1 is divided into the follow-
ing two steps.
Step (i) (u1, u2) of the form (29) is the Nash equilibrium
point indeed.
We first write down the Hamiltonian function
Hi
(
t, x, x˜, v1, v2, qi, ki1, ki2
)
, qi
(
a(t)x + a¯(t)x˜+ b1(t)v1 + b2(t)v2
)
+ ki1c1
+ ki2(t)c2 +
1
2
(
gix
2 + g¯ix˜
2 +miv
2
i
)
. (33)
Applying Theorem 3.1, we derive the candidate Nash equi-
librium point of the form (29) and the coupled FBSDE of
mean-field type (30)-(32). We can check that ϕi(x, x˜) =
1
2 (hix
2 + h¯ix˜
2) and Hi
(
t, x, x˜, v1, v2, qi, ki1, ki2
)
in (33) sat-
isfy the conditions in Theorem 3.2. Therefore,
(
u1(·), u2(·)
)
of the form (29) is the Nash equilibrium point indeed.
Based on the arguments in Step (i), we conclude that the
existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium points are
equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of the solutions to
(30)-(32).
Step (ii) The solutions of (30)-(32) are existent and unique.
Taking mathematical expectation on both sides of (30)-(32),
we have the following forward-backward ordinary equations

dEx(t) =
[
(a(t) + a¯(t))Ex(t)
−m−11 (t)b
2
1(t)Eq1(t)−m
−1
2 (t)b
2
2(t)Eq2(t)
]
dt,
Ex(0) = x0,
(34)


−dEq1(t) =
[
(a(t) + a¯(t))Eq1(t)
+ (g1(t) + g¯1(t))Ex(t)
]
dt,
Eq1(T ) =(h1 + h¯1)Ex(T ),
(35)
and 

−dEq2(t) =
[
(a(t) + a¯(t))Eq2(t)
+ (g2(t) + g¯2(t))Ex(t)
]
dt,
Eq2(T ) =(h2 + h¯2)Ex(T ).
(36)
Applying the method as shown in Chang and Xiao [7] and As-
sumption (A3), we can prove there exists a unique solution
(Ex(t),Eq1(t),Eq2(t)) to (34)-(36) with the relations as fol-
lows:
Eqi(t) = αi(t)Ex(t), i = 1, 2, (37)
Ex(t) = x0e
∫
t
0
[a(s)+a¯(s)−m−1
1
(s)b2
1
(s)(α1(s)+α2(s))]ds, (38)
where (α1, α2) is the unique solution of the following Riccati
equations
α˙1 + 2(a+ a¯)α1 −m
−1
1 b
2
1α
2
1 −m
−1
2 b
2
2α1α2
+ g1 + g¯1 = 0, (39)
α˙2 + 2(a+ a¯)α2 −m
−1
1 b
2
1α1α2 −m
−1
2 b
2
2α
2
2
+ g2 + g¯2 = 0, (40)
subject to αi(T ) = hi + h¯i.
Substituting (37) into (31) and (32), taking conditional
mathematical expectation on both sides of (30)-(32) with re-
spect to Fw1t and applying Lemma 5.4 in Xiong [14], we have

dxˆ(t) =
[
a(t)xˆ(t) + a¯(t)Ex(t) −m−11 (t)b
2
1(t)qˆ1(t)
−m−12 (t)b
2
2(t)qˆ2(t)
]
dt+ c1(t)dw1(t),
xˆ(0) = x0,
(41)

− dqˆ1(t) =
[
a(t)qˆ1(t) + g1(t)xˆ(t)
+
(
a¯(t)α1(t) + g¯1(t)
)
Ex(t)
]
dt− kˆ11(t)dw1(t),
qˆ1(T ) = h1xˆ(T ) + h¯1Ex(T ),
(42)


− dqˆ2(t) =
[
a(t)qˆ2(t) + g2(t)xˆ(t)
+
(
a¯(t)α2(t) + g¯2(t)
)
Ex(t)
]
dt− kˆ21(t)dw1(t),
qˆ2(T ) = h2xˆ(T ) + h¯2Ex(T ),
(43)
which constitute a kind of fully coupled forward-backward
stochastic filtering equations of mean-field type and exist the
unique solution (xˆ, qˆ1, kˆ11, qˆ2, kˆ21).
Similarly, based on the known Ex,Eq1,Eq2, qˆ1
and qˆ2, there also exists the unique solution(
x, (q1, k11, k12), (q2, k21, k22)
)
to (30)-(32).
Part 2. We need to verify the feedback form of the Nash
equilibrium point in (29) is represented by (28).
Based on the terminal conditions in (42) and (43), we set
qˆi(t) = τi(t)xˆ(t) + δi(t)Ex(t), i = 1, 2, (44)
subject to τi(T ) = hi and δi(T ) = h¯i. Applying Itoˆ’s formula
to qˆ1(t)
(
resp. qˆ2(t)
)
in (44) and comparing the coefficients of
xˆ(t) and Ex(t) between it and (42) (resp. (43)), respectively,
we get{
τ˙1 + 2aτ1 −m
−1
1 b
2
1τ
2
1 −m
−1
2 b
2
2τ1τ2 + g1 = 0,
τ˙2 + 2aτ2 −m
−1
2 b
2
2τ
2
2 −m
−1
1 b
2
1τ1τ2 + g2 = 0,
(45)


δ˙1 +
(
2a+ a¯−m−11 b
2
1α1 −m
−1
2 b
2
2α2 −m
−1
1 b
2
1τ1
)
δ1
−m−12 b
2
2τ1δ2 + a¯τ1 + a¯α1 + g¯1 = 0,
δ˙2 +
(
2a+ a¯−m−11 b
2
1α1 −m
−1
2 b
2
2α2 −m
−1
2 b
2
2τ2
)
δ2
−m−11 b
2
1τ2δ1 + a¯τ2 + a¯α2 + g¯2 = 0,
(46)
with τi(T ) = hi and δi(T ) = h¯i. Applying the method as
shown in Chang and Xiao [7] and Assumption (A3), there exist
the unique solutions to (45) and (46).
Substituting (44) into (41), we can derive the explicit solu-
tion as follow:
xˆ(t) = x0Φ
t
0 +
∫ t
0
Φtsc1(s)dw1(s)
+
∫ t
0
Φts
(
a¯−m−11 b
2
1δ1 −m
−1
2 b
2
2δ2
)
(s)Ex(s)ds (47)
with Φts = exp{
∫ t
s
(a − m−11 b
2
1τ1 − m
−1
2 b
2
2τ2)(r)dr}. The
proof is completed. 
5 Conclusion Remarks
In this paper, we study non-zero sum mean-field game with
partial information and derive the stochastic maximum princi-
ple and verification theorem for the Nash equilibrium points.
Compared with the existing literature, the contributions of this
paper are:
• Partial information is more general case than complete in-
formation. The results partly generalize the related mean-
field control or game problems with complete information
(see e.g. [1, 2, 11, 15]);
• Mean-field-type forward-backward stochastic filtering
equations are found, which enriches the theory of clas-
sical filtering;
• The unique Nash equilibrium point in the LQ example is
represented in the feedback form of not only the optimal
filtering but also the expected value of the system state,
through the solutions of some Riccati equations.
In addition, since there are many partial information mean-
field game problems in finance and economics, we hope the
results have applications in these related areas.
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